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Abstract
The theoretical fault-lines in liberal democratic theory have always been located in at least two
important sites: that of process or procedure, and that of outcome. As to the former, the prob-
lem has been that of trying to ensure that the »will of the people« – or at least of the relevant
people, the eligible voters – gets to be expressed through meaningful, practical mechanisms.
According to the consensus shared by most mainstream liberal democratic theorists of the re-
cent past, elections to representative bodies and subsequent votes by the winners of these elec-
tions are such mechanisms. But of course at every turn we constantly find instances of elected
governments thwarting the majority views of the same body of individuals by which they were
originally elected.
Liberal democratic theory says that, as long as the appropriate procedures for manifesting the
majority (or, in some instances, mere plurality) will of the people concerning who is to repre-
sent them were followed, then the representatives are justified in voting against the apparent
will of the people. But this is a clear practical contradiction.
As for the the question of outcome, here recent liberal democratic theory has dug an even
deeper hole for itself by abandoning the notion of a common good, to which at least some ear-
lier theorists in this tradition still subscribed.
Liberal democratic theory has ultimately denied itself any critical function with respect to out-
comes. Instead, it is forced to ratify every outcome, however clearly misguided or even tragic it
may be, as long as it is the product of the accepted authoritative set of procedures and institutions.
Surely the new theoretical direction will need to come to grips with all the elements mostly ab-
sent from the Rawlsian approach and from the writings of most of Rawls’ liberal democratic
fellow travelers: power, violence, domination, ideology, decision, interpretation, political ex-
pression, revolution, history, economy, biopolitics.
New models for social and political philosophy are desperately needed!
My title is deliberately ambiguous, and it is so in at least two ways. First,
there is the question mark at the end; this always makes for ambiguity. It
can mean that the writer/speaker is himself or herself not sure, or that he
or she is sure, one way or the other – that is, yes or no on the issue – but
wants coyly to conceal this certainty at the beginning and then lead the
reader/listener along a path of persuasion. Secondly, there is ambiguity in
the expression, »liberal democracy«: it can obviously mean liberal demo-
cracy as a set of practices – the exact delineation of which, as I shall be at-
tempting to remind you, is itself very far from clear – but it can also mean
liberal democracy as a theory. So, let me begin by clarifying these ambigui-
*
A later version of this paper will be pub-
lished in Volume 22 (2006) of the series, So-
cial Philosophy Today, edited by the Philoso-
phy Documentation Center, Charlottesville,
Virginia, USA.
ties: First, am I not sure about the purported demise of liberal democracy,
or am I sure but just being coy? Answer: I’m not sure which. Second, do I
mean liberal democracy as a set of practices, or liberal democracy as a the-
ory? Answer: I mean both.
Then there is yet another, quite classic ambiguity in my title: Who are
»we«? We Croats? We erstwhile citizens of a nation called Yugoslavia?
We Americans? We West Europeans + Americans? We West Europeans
+ Americans + Central Europeans? We cosmopolitan internationalists?
We philosophers of the world? I don’t know; we will see.
Among the better-known, and also more creative, theorists associated with
ideals of liberal democracy over the past half-century has been Robert
Dahl, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Yale University.
Among his by now less well remembered publications is After the Revolu-
tion?, a small volume written at a time of revolution-talk in the world at
large – as everyone knows, the key year for this was 1968 – and even, in its
own small way, at Yale. Among those who paraded through Yale during
those years were, among others, Bill Clinton – who, as was recently called
to my attention by a friend who saw my name mentioned in Bill’s autobiog-
raphy, took a graduate course on natural law and philosophy that I taught
–, Hilary Clinton, John Kerry, John Dean, Shrub (the lesser Bush), and, as
I have already indicated, myself. Thus the fact that the most sacred Yale
song ends with the words, »For God, for country, and for Yale« may not be
quite as good an example of the word, »anti-climactic,« as one English-
language dictionary says it is. By the time Dahl’s book was published, revo-
lutionary fervor had already subsided to such an extent that, as I remarked
somewhere, the question mark at the end of his title might just as well be
dropped. (Perhaps the same should be said concerning the question mark
at the end of my title for this paper; we will see.)
On page 4 of After the Revolution?, Dahl makes the following very wise
comment, to which I take no serious exception:
»(B)ecause democracy has never been fully achieved, it has always been and is now a poten-
tially revolutionary doctrine. For every system purporting to be democratic is vulnerable to
the charge that it is not democratic enough, or is not ‘really’ or fully democratic. The charge is
bound to be correct, since no polity has ever been completely democratized.«1
The other citation that I would like to make from this book comes later. It
reflects, above all, the feelings of intense anger and frustration that even
politically moderate American intellectuals had come to have concerning
their government’s war against Vietnam. Here it is:
»The greatest obstacle to democratization and reducing inequalities in the United States is
not that bugbear with which the Left, old and new, is invariably so obsessed, an elite of
wealthy men, or even that military-industrial complex so much referred to these days, but
rather the military-industrial-labor-farming-educational-professional-consumer-over and un-
der thirty-lower/middle/upper class complex that, for want of a more appropriate name, might
be called the American people.«2
It is now confession time for me. I chided Robert Dahl for writing these
words. I commented, first, that his remarks about the radical tradition, his
lumping together of the old and new Left and his associating both with a
vulgar conspiratorial view of history, amounted to a truly unjustifiable
oversimplification. I do not regret having said that. But I then went on, in
addition, to criticize him for proposing what I called a »universal conspira-
cy theory«, which assumed that the millions of Americans who had, accord-
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ing to polls, supported the United States government’s war against Viet-
nam were sufficiently well informed to make a genuine »personal choice«
concerning that policy. (»Personal choice« is the first of three criteria for
legitimate authority that Dahl lists in After the Revolution?, the others being
competence and efficiency.) Although I do not think that my theoretical
point about personal choice was incorrect, I do now regret having taking
Professor Dahl to task for his disgust with the American people. I now
realize, in light of more recent events, that he was right to be so disgusted,
and I was wrong to chide him for this. I am very sorry, Bob!
Where, the reader may be asking him- or herself, did I do this chiding in
the first place, or make the previously-mentioned suggestion about drop-
ping the question mark in the title? Was it only in my mind? No, it was also
on paper. I wrote a book-length manuscript entitled In Vindication of Revo-
lutionary Ideals: A Reply to Professor Dahl, for which I had received initial
encouragement from the Yale University Press and, once I had submitted
it, was accorded what in his own words to me was a »glowing« review by
Shlomo Avineri, whom they had asked to be its reader. But it was never
published in English and became part of a very long debacle, by no means
the only debacle in my life, that led to my eventually leaving Yale for the
position that I have held since then.
The reader will have noted, if he or she has been attentive, that I said »in
English«. In what, if any, other language might this work of mine eventu-
ally have been published? The reader would have been correct if he or she
had answered »Norwegian«. My criticisms, somewhat abridged and not in
fact including the paragraph in which I made my criticism of Dahl’s attack
on the American people, were finally published in Oslo, in 1980, along with
a reply to me by Dahl and my reply to him and his final reply to me, under
the title Demokrati og autoritet. It is a little-known classic – very little known
indeed – of twentieth century political theory.
In the same part of my »Anti-Dahl«, as it has been called, there is another
passage that did appear in the translation, on p. 67, and that I continue to
this day to ponder: do I or do I not believe what I wrote there? It refers to
the time of escalation of the Vietnam conflict, beginning after the Ameri-
can Presidential elections of 1964, and harkens back to Dahl’s analysis,
with which I was and am sympathetic, of the disastrous decision made by
the Athenian democracy, as reported by Thucydides, to launch an expedi-
tion against Syracuse. The text that I wish to cite constitutes only the sec-
ond half of a very long sentence in English, whereas it is broken up into
three sentences in Norwegian. So I will cite the Norwegian text, which is
obviously much better stylistically than the English original:
»Min konklusjon må bli at det ville ha værtt bedre både for USA og resten av verden om en
liten, men forstandig gruppe på et tidlig tidspunkt hadde grepet inn og omgjort regjeringens
beslutninger. De måtte ha anvendt midler som lå utenfor de vanlige politiske beslutningspros-
essene som angivelig er basert på ‘Personlig valg’. De måtte kort sagt ha grepet inn ved hjelp
av revolusjonær taktikk.«3
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»It would have been better, I conclude, if a small but clear-headed group had succeeded at an
early point in reversing the government’s decisions by means external to those American insti-
tutional procedures that are supposedly based on ‘Personal choice’ – in short, by revolutio-
nary tactics.«
I went on to say that something like this did in fact occur, namely, the pro-
test demonstrations of subsequent years, when one heard all the talk about
the need for revolution that led to Dahl’s writing his book.
This is an eternally-recurring issue in political theory, and particularly in
democratic political theory – understanding »democratic« in the broadest
possible sense, meaning rule (in whatever forms it may be exercised) by
»the many«. Which is more important: that there be universal, or nearly
universal, participation in governance processes by the citizens, or that the
outcome of government policy decisions be one that is in their long-term
best interest? In order to believe that these two options always coincide,
one would have to be either a liar or else a dogmatic believer in the propo-
sition that whatever a majority of the people say they wish at any given
time is always, eo ipso, right. And yet that form of democratic theory
known as liberal democratic theory, or simply classical liberalism, going
back at least as far as Locke and forward through Mill to the present time,
at least makes the tacit assumption, if not the dogmatic assertion, that ma-
jority rule will ultimately produce the best realistically possible outcome.
The principal home of political liberalism is the West European cultural
world, which of course includes North America and Australia. Despite
some doubts based on messy past historical facts such as American slavery,
European colonialism, and the capitulation of the Weimar Republic, the
theorists who have embodied this tradition have generally been able, at
least until recently, to live in a rarified, self-congratulatory atmosphere
within which they know that their ways – that is, the trappings of elections,
parliaments and assemblies, representative government in general – are
the best ways and the ways that must ultimately prevail in this good world
that is ours. Of course it has always been admitted that corruption can en-
ter into these processes to subvert them – elections can be bought, special
interests can exert undue influence over assemblies, and so on – but it has
been assumed that with sufficient reforms, vigorously undertaken, such aber-
rations will be corrected. The electoral process in the State of Florida in
the year 2000 and its bizarre resolution by the Courts could be seen to have
constituted another aberration, one that permitted some of us to call Shrub
simply the »de facto« President, the legitimacy of whose Presidency was in
serious doubt.
But the four years since his installation in office have raised even more se-
rious doubts about the institutions of liberal democracy themselves. The
destruction of the so-called »Twin Towers« in New York precipitated a se-
ries of events that would, for the most part, have gladdened the hearts of
the attackers, if any of them had lived. In the name of saving and even ex-
tending liberal democracy, a number of its traditional practices and institu-
tions, such as they were, on both domestic and international levels were
undermined, in ways too well known and too numerous to mention, by the
United States Administration. Then at last came the opportunity, in the
elections of 2004, for the American people to renounce proto-fascism by
voting against the President and his party. True, there were many instan-
ces, once again, of voting manipulation and of massive infusions of funds
by special interests in order to try to purchase the outcome that they de-
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sired, namely, the hitherto de facto President’s first »legitimate« national
election victory. True, the mass media and the newer forms of communica-
tion, such as bloggers’ websites, were filled with invective, distortions, and
outright lies. But to most of us, alas, the final outcome, as close as it was,
does not seem attributable in the last analysis to fraud and aberrant de-
ployment of the system in the way in which one could easily say this con-
cerning the events of the year 2000.
The reaction to what happened has been, on the one side, a spirit of trium-
phalism, and on the other side a sense of deep depression and anger, creat-
ing a division such as has perhaps not been experienced to the same depth
in my country since the mid-nineteenth century. Particularly in light of the
apparently almost exceptionless disapprobation of the principal policies
and stances of this same American administration by large popular majori-
ties in the rest of the world, one is strongly tempted to agree with Dahl’s
words concerning the American people during the Vietnam era. I have
thus far seen no analysis of the putative reasons for the outcome – Chris-
tian religious zealotry, lack of information, the power of the incumbency,
insufficient funds on the side of the opposition Democratic Party, unattrac-
tiveness of its own candidate, etc., etc. – that seems truly persuasive, truly
explanatory. Perhaps the most likely route to an explanation is the general
one that was followed by Natalija Miæunoviæ in her analysis of Serbian na-
tionalism, along lines of group psychology with psychiatrically pathological
elements. The combination of intensely nationalistic self-love and deep,
irrational fear within large segments of the American population is very
real. And yet to insist exclusively on this does not seem to me quite ade-
quate, quite fully explanatory, either.
So perhaps we should take another look at trends in political philosophy,
the thème de base of the conference for which I originally prepared this pa-
per,** for some clues concerning the subversion of liberal democracy by
those who are most loudly proclaiming themselves its champions. I would
like to begin this part of my article by returning to the focus of my paper
given at this same conference four years earlier, i.e. – John Rawls. For it
seems to me that the liberal current of thought has suffered a loss of faith,
the result of which at the present time is that it is on the verge of a quite
considerable transformation, and that this change is clearly visible in the
evolution of Rawls’s own thought. From the theory of justice advanced in
his first book, where one senses a certain confidence in its being, all things
considered, the best such theory (at least for modern societies), there was a
definite retreat in his Political Liberalism and other works published later.
To put it simply, he no longer claimed, in the latter, to be giving us a theory
of universal import; now, according to him, it was simply a matter of a
purely »political« solution, with no »metaphysical« ambitions, to the prob-
lems created by the existence, in large modern societies, of a number of
groups with »comprehensive«, non-liberal, sets of beliefs. (Rawls became
virtually obsessed by religions with fundamentalist tendencies.) Regarded
in this way, political liberalism is therefore little more than a means of al-
lowing for the peaceful coexistence, in any given society, of such groups
with one another and with others. Finally, in the small volume of his last
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years, The Law of Peoples, Rawls complacently accepted the extreme and
ever-increasing global division between the rich and the poor, to which he
refused to apply his own principles of justice, and he created a sort of
worldwide bestiary of his private devising, in which one finds good liberal
societies such as his own, »decent« hierarchical societies of lesser value but
with which, nevertheless, »we« should be able to coexist, and lastly bad,
outlaw states. Although we may be struck by the banality and naïveté of
this »vision«, I believe that it is merely a rather faithful reflection of the op-
pressive mystification that characterizes the current Western political world,
where the American President, who was first »elected« under the circum-
stances that I have recalled, claims to be spreading justice and freedom
while everywhere reinforcing the capitalist military and police state. In this
atmosphere, the very word »liberalism« becomes suspect, and elections be-
gin increasingly to be regarded as, to coin a phrase taken from the title of a
late essay by Jean-Paul Sartre, a »trap for fools«.4
The philosophical reaction against Rawlsism that is beginning and that I
share is rather well captured in the following text, which comes near the
end of a review, by Martin Schnell, of some of Rawls’ books in German
translation:
»Es ist eigentlich erstaunlich, dass Rawls ausgerechnet als moderner Klassiker der politischen
Philosophie angesehen wird. Erstaunlich, weil Rawls’ Texte eines bewesen: Unkenntnis vom
Politischen! Rawls verfügt über eine normative Ethik. Das ist alles. Was sagt diese Ethik zu
Begriffen und Sachen wie Macht, Gewalt, Herrschaft, Ideologie, Entscheidung, Interpreta-
tion, politischer Ausdruck, Revolution, Geschichte, Ökonomie, Biopolitik? Nichts oder fast
Nichts! Rawls, der sich als Nachfahre Kants versteht, stellt sich den politischen Prozess wie
ein Student aus Neuengland vor. Nämlich als Anwendung von Regeln, die dem gesunden
Menschenverstand der oberen Mittelschicht unmittelbar plausibel sind. Die Unterbestim-
mung des Politischen hat darin wohl ihre Hauptursache.«5
But it is not just Rawls who is included in this reaction: it is an entire theo-
retical literature that in the last analysis has turned out to be complicitous
with the, so to speak, »real liberal democracies« (I am drawing a parallel
with the former so-called »really existing socialisms«), arrogant and do-
mination-minded, the practices and pretensions of which have come under
so much scrutiny in the wake of recent events. This literature has been
most complicitous, of course, with the most real/most unreal liberal demo-
cracy of all, the United States.
The theoretical fault-lines in liberal democratic theory have always been
located in at least two important sites: that of process or procedure, and
that of outcome. As to the former, the problem has been that of trying to
ensure that the »will of the people« – or at least of the relevant people, the
eligible voters, the precise identity of which creates a further, overwhelm-
ing problem to which I shall return later – gets to be expressed through
meaningful, practical mechanisms. According to the consensus shared by
most mainstream liberal democratic theorists of the recent past, elections
to representative bodies and subsequent votes by the winners of these elec-
tions are such mechanisms. But of course, at every turn we constantly find
instances of elected governments thwarting the majority views of the same
body of individuals by which they were originally elected. For example,
right now Shrub is insisting on the destruction of the national American
pension system, called social security, as we have known it since the 1930s,
and yet polls show large majorities, much larger than that by which he and
his party won the elections in November, to be opposed to this. Of course,
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these sentiments could change. But I offer it as a simple current example
of my point, which surely does not need to be elabored. Liberal democratic
theory says that, as long as the appropriate procedures for manifesting the
majority (or, in some instances, mere plurality) will of the people concern-
ing who is to represent them were followed, then the representatives are
justified in voting against the apparent will of the people. But this is a clear
practical contradiction.
As for the the question of outcome, here recent liberal democratic theory
has dug an even deeper hole for itself by abandoning the notion of a com-
mon good, to which at least some earlier theorists in this tradition still sub-
scribed. Rawls makes this move very conspicuously in A Theory of Justice,
insisting on a purely individualistic conception of »the good«. But by refus-
ing to accept as potentially valid or determinative any argument to the ef-
fect that the current preferences of the majority might be harmful to the
long-range best interest, or common good, of the society in question – as in
the Syracuse and Vietnam cases, for example – and taking Dahl’s notion of
»personal preference«, here and now, as an ultimate criterion for political
authority, liberal democratic theory has ultimately denied itself any critical
function with respect to outcomes. Instead, it is forced to ratify every out-
come, however clearly misguided or even tragic it may be, as long as it is
the product of the accepted authoritative set of procedures and institu-
tions.
Finally, liberal democratic theorists have, almost without exception, ac-
cepted some version of the oxymoron known as »liberal nationalism«. Li-
beralism is committed in principle to a sense of universality, famously ex-
pressed in John Locke’s assertion that »a child is born a subject of no coun-
try or government«, which is in essence the same as Rousseau’s »L’homme
est né libre«. Yet theorists such as Rawls typically dismiss out of hand all
challenges to the systems of exclusivity and restricted immigration rights
that characterize, in one form or another, all countries in the world today.
As the author of a very cogent study of this issue, Phillip Coles, says at the
conclusion of his book, Philosophies of Exclusion. Liberal Political Theory
and Immigration:
»(A)t the beginning of this book… I asked whether liberal political philosophy could answer
the membership question in terms that were consistent with its central moral principles and
commitments, and I have suggested that the answer to this question is that it cannot. Any so-
lution that has been offered to justify exlusive membership – and therefore immigration and
naturalisation regulations – has given rise to an incoherence between the liberal polity’s inter-
nal and external principles: those within its boundaries are subject to liberal principles and
practices, while those at the border are subjected to illiberal principles and practices.«6
These deep fault lines have always existed just below the surface of the
theoretical perspective in question. A serious intellectual challenge was
presented to it by Marxism, but eventually the collapse of most regimes
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calling themselves Marxist helped to sap Marxism’s theoretical appeal –
whether fairly or unfairly is another question. In a sense, I am claiming that
a comparable undermining is beginning to occur today with respect to libe-
ral democratic theory, whether or not altogether fairly, as a result above all
of the blatant hypocrisy and internal contradictions of the superpower that
calls itself liberal democratic. This is occurring at the same time as appeals
to the spirit of democracy as such, occurring in such varied forms as the re-
cent demonstrations in Kiev and Beirut and the gigantic anti-globalization
conference in Porto Allegre, are raising a few new hopes, here and there,
for a better world. As always, there is much that is cloudy and unclear in
the current global situation. But we may eventually see emerging new, less
hypocritical and militaristic, more human rights-friendly, and perhaps also
more cosmopolitan forms of sociopolitical organization around the world.
If, as is already beginning to happen, the present American Administration
begins to try to take credit for such developments, it will in a certain sense
be justified in doing so, but primarily in accordance with dialectical princi-
ples; that is, observing the old self-styled liberal democracy come to grief as
a neo-fascist police state may be helping to stimulate the quest for new,
more coherent and more inclusive forms of democracy, ultimately to be ex-
tended to a worldwide scale in accordance with the principle that those
who are affected by policies should have a right to participate in shaping
and either ratifying or repudiating them. I mean, who in this world is not a
potential stakeholder – to borrow a buzzword from the field of business
ethics – in the results of American militarism and military practices?
Should not everyone, therefore, have a right to participate, at least in some
small way, in reshaping the policies that have produced them?
Surely the new theoretical direction will need to come to grips with all the
elements listed by Martin Schnell as mostly absent from the Rawlsian ap-
proach and, as I added, from the writings of most of Rawls’ liberal demo-
cratic fellow travelers: power, violence, domination, ideology, decision, in-
terpretation, political expression, revolution, history, economy, biopolitics.
Along similar lines, the new direction will need to pay more attention to
the kinds of study that I listed at the end of my bitter, but unfortunately
prescient, paper given at the same conference three years ago as the one at
which this present paper was first presented, entitled »Political Philosophy,
One World, and Superpower Patriotism«, namely: (1) the problem of a sin-
gle power that claims to own our world and to have the right to make deci-
sions about whom to attack, and when, whom to declare subversive and
whom not, entirely on its own if and whenever it is so inclined; (2) the
problem of new forms of totalitarianism in the name of »zero tolerance«
against terrorists; (3) the issue of despotic tendencies to suppress even
long-established and internationally-recognized rights and rules – the
words »Abu Ghraib« have since become parts of our vocabularies as one
horrible instantiation of such tendencies – in the name of a newly closed
society; (4) war studies as complements to existing peace studies, though
not substitutes for them, since the latter, however utopian they may be to-
day, still retain subversive potential (as recently demonstrated once again
by public attacks on peace studies programs in my own home State of Indi-
ana by a right-wing zealot with a national following named David Horow-
itz); and (5) the issue of superpower patriotism itself, of a militarily gigan-
tesque country filled with millions of self-congratulatory nationalist cheer-
leaders who are convinced that they are »Number One« in every important
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way, and that all others are simply wrong. As I said in the penultimate
paragraph of that paper:
»The directions that I am proposing for a political philosophy that is in touch with our times
are subversive, of course, because in most respects they are based on a view of the world that
contradicts the official story. ‘We’ are still supposed to be democratic, rights-respecting,
freedom-loving, and even peace-loving; as has been pointed out, Bush has defended his talk
of unending war on grounds of self-defense. For Western philosophers today to point out the
hypocrisy of this is akin to the position in which philosophers in the former Eastern Bloc
found themselves when they argued that alienation still existed under socialism. It is clear that
there are many in power in the West who would love to suppress dissent. As my story [about a
philosopher who refused to engage in public criticism of an American training camp for South
American military personnel, lest she be found guilty of violating the so-called ‘Patriot Act’]
illustrates, they have already taken the first steps in the direction of doing so.«
Further steps have since been taken. One recent illustration that comes im-
mediately to mind is the prosecution of a veteran New York lawyer who
had represented a radical Egyptian cleric at his trial and who had violated
an agreement not to broadcast any of his statements, made in prison, to his
followers back in the Middle East. She violated an agreement and might,
according to past practices, have been reprimanded by the association of
professional lawyers; but instead the United States government charged
her with subversion, a crime punishable by many years in prison, and ob-
tained a conviction from a complacent jury – and this in New York, not in
Texas. Another recent illustration, this time not from the United States, is
the very severe anti-terrorist law, allowing long-term incarceration without
trial and the suppression of a number of other heretofore accepted rights,
that Prime Minister Blair has been pushing through the British Parliament.
In short, the old supposed bastion of liberal democratic practice, the Uni-
ted States, along with some other countries in its orbit, is changing its cha-
racter and succumbing, little by little, to forces of reaction; a single party,
which is itself moving ever further toward the Right, controls all the bran-
ches of government at the federal level. The bland, hopeful tolerance of
old liberal democratic theory with respect to what Coles termed »internal
principles« – a tolerance that is well illustrated by Rawls’ conception of po-
litical liberalism as the coexistence, on the level of practice, of groups hold-
ing clashing »comprehensive doctrines« – is no match for the hard reality
of a »zero tolerance« mentality that has come to prevail, while in their »ex-
ternal principles« most avatars of that same theory have always been more
complicitous than not with the imperialism of the leading self-styled liberal
democracies. As the call for papers for the conference at which these re-
marks were first presented implies, new models are desperately needed!
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W. L. McBride
Das Ende der liberalen Demokratie
wie wir sie gekannt haben?
Theoretisch befanden sich die falschen Linien in der Theorie der liberalen Demokratie schon immer
an mindestens zwei wichtigen Stellen: im Prozess oder Prozedere und im Resultat. Was das Erste
betrifft, so bestand das Problem darin, dass versucht wurde sicherzustellen, dass der »Wille des
Volkes« – oder zumindest der der relevanten Menschen, der wählbaren Wähler – durch anschauli-
che, praktische Mechanismen zum Ausdruck kommt. Entsprechend dem Konsens der bedeutend-
sten Theoretiker der liberalen Demokratie in der neueren Vergangenheit gelten als solche
Mechanismen die Wahlen für Repräsentativorgane und die nachfolgenden Stimmen der Wahl-
sieger. Doch auf jedem Schritt stoßen wir auf Instanzen der gewählten Regierungen, die die
Mehrheitsansichten desselben Personenkreises, von dem sie ursprünglich gewählt worden waren,
preisgeben. Die Theorie der liberalen Demokratie besagt, dass solange angebrachte Verfahren zum
Ausdruck des Willens der Mehrheit angewandt werden (oder in einigen Fällen, der bloßen
Mehrzahl) im Hinblick darauf, wer sie vertreten soll, die Vertreter berechtigt sind, gegen den manife-
sten Willen des Volkes zu stimmen. Doch dies ist natürlich ein offensichtlicher Widerspruch. Was die
Frage der Resultate betrifft, so hat sich die neueste Theorie der liberalen Demokratie eine noch tief-
ere Grube gegraben, da sie sich vom Begriff des Allgemeinwohls abgewandt hat, zu dem zumindest
einige frühere Theoretiker in dieser Tradition standen. Die Theorie der liberalen Demokratie hat sich
letztlich selbst jegliche kritische Funktion in Bezug auf die Resultate abgesprochen. Statt dessen ist
sie gezwungen, jedes Ergebnis zu ratifizieren, ohne Rücksicht darauf, wie offensichtlich es irre-
führend oder sogar tragisch sein mag, solange es das Erzeugnis einer akzeptierten autoritativen Bün-
dels von Verfahren und Institutionen ist. Eine neue theoretische Richtung wird sicherlich gegen alle
Elemente ankämpfen müssen, die größtenteils im Rawlsschen Ansatz und den Schriften der meisten
seiner liberaldemokratischen Mitläufer fehlen: mit Macht, Gewalt, Domination, Ideologie, Ent-
schlüssen, Deutungen, politischem Ausdruck, Revolution, Geschichte, Ökonomie, Biopolitik. Was
wir dringend brauchen, sind neue Modelle sozialer und politischer Philosophie!
William L. McBride
La fin de la démocratie libérale
telle que nous l’avons connue?
Les failles dans la théorie de la démocratie libérale ont été toujours localisées dans au moins deux
sphères importantes: celle de la procédure et celle des résultats. En ce qui concerne la première, le
problème réside dans le fait que l’on tâche que »la volonté du peuple« – ou du moins celle du peu-
ple pertinent, des électeurs éligibles – s’exprime à travers des mécanismes signifiants et pratiques.
Suivant le consenus partagé jusqu’à récemment par la plupart des théoriciens orthodoxes de la
démocratie libérale, les élections à des cops représentatifs et les votes ultérieurs des gagnants de ces
élections constituent de tels mécanismes. Or, on constate à tout bout de champ que différentes in-
stances des pouvoirs élus agissent à l’encontre de l’opinion des groupements de personnes qui les
ont élus. La théorie de la démocratie libérale dit que, tant que l’on respecte les procédures appro-
priées permettant l’expression majoritaire (ou, à certaines instances, seulement plurielle) de la vo-
lonté du peuple quant à ceux qui le représenteront, les représentants sont légitimés à voter contre la
volonté apparente du peuple. Or, c’est une pure condradiction pratique. En ce qui concerne la
question des résultats, la théorie récente de la démocratie libérale s’est creusé là une fosse encore
plus profonde en abandonnant le concept de bien commun, auquel souscrivaient du moins
quelques-uns des théoriciens plus traditionnels. La théorie de la démocratie libérale a finalement
renoncé à toute fonction critique à l’égard des résultats. Par contre, elle est obligée de ratifier tout
résultat, quelque déplorable ou même tragique qu’il puisse être, tant qu’il soit le produit de l’en-
semble habilité des procédures et des institutions admises. Or, la nouvelle orientation théorique
devra s’attaquer à tous les éléments qui sont absents dans l’approche rawlsienne et dans les écrits
de la plupart des disciples libéraux de Rawls: pouvoir, violence, domination, idéologie, décision,
interprétation, expression politique, révolution, histoire, économie, biopolitique. On a désespé-
rément besoin de nouveaux modèles opour la philosophie sociale et politique!
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